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The author's discussion of Jacobi's realism is even more uncertain in tenor. He is uneasy at the idea of classing him as a realist and yet is forced to do so, formally at least. His trouble lies in his failure to understand what this realism means in this connection. Jacobi believed that our experience is not a mere train of subjective mental states, sensations and ideas, but that real objects are given us immediately and are the objects to which out thought refers. "In the first and simplest perception there must be the 'I' and the 'thou,' inner consciousness and external object existing together in the soul: both in the same indivisible moment, without before or after, without any operation of the understanding, nay, even without in the slightest degree beginning the production of the concept of cause and effect" (p. 57). Real objects, not ideas, are thus the primary data of knowledge and, though independent of us, given in our experience. They are revealed to us as things beyond us, yet within us. Their being known by us adds nothing to their reality, which is the condition of our accidental knowing of them. And this reality which objects have is not a mere phenomenal reality, such as Kant ascribed to the objects of knowledge, but is a complete noumenal reality, so that our author's assertion that Jacobi is no 'more of a realist than Kant' is hard to understand. It is quite true that the most important, if not ultimately all, realities are for Jacobi of a spiritual nature, subjects rather than substances, yet this is obviously beside the question of the relation of our knowledge to its object. With his insistence upon the ultimate significance of the individual person and the impossibility of turning faith into knowledge, Jacobi would have been the last to accept the monism of the Hegelian idealism. Such a monism was for him always the type of a rational philosophy, but, as such, always the proof that a rational philosophy was inadequate as a formulation of reality. As an upholder of the doctrine of the primacy and independence of spiritual reals, Jacobi must be looked upon as the founder of the realistic opposition to that line of idealists of whom Kant was the first.

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Mathematical Emancipations. C. J. KEYSER. *Monist,* January, 1906. Pp. 65–83.

The clear and elementary account of the concept of dimensionality which Professor Keyser has given us under the above somewhat mystifying title is especially welcome, inasmuch as writers in our philosophic journals are wont to drag Kantianism into the discussion and so confuse the issue. We regret, however, to find the paper confined, for the most part, to the exposition of mathematical facts, ignoring the work of Poincaré,[1] who has presented essentially the same material and interpreted it with great philosophic insight.

The creation of manifolds by the act of discrimination, says Professor Keyser, is the most primitive manifestation of mind. The dimensionality of a manifold, mathematical or otherwise, depends upon the number of independent facts which must be known to distinguish any element of it from all the other elements. But the dimensionality depends in part upon the will of the investigator; the plane is two-dimensional in terms of either points or lines, but if treated as a collection of circles, as is perfectly permissible, it is three-dimensional, since two independent data are required for position and one for size in the case of each element. It is four-dimensional in parabolas, five-dimensional in conics, etc., 'without limit' (p. 75). We can in like manner analyze any configurations of space in many different ways. The mystery of hyperdimensionality vanishes in the simplicity of these considerations, and we see that our preference for the point among possible elements is to be explained through the fact that 'practical man precedes man rational and determines for the latter his rational choices' (p. 77).[2]

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[1] Cf. especially 'Science et Hypothèse,' Part 2. Paris, 1902.

Dimensionalities exceeding three in *points* have a special interest. Such manifolds are created in thought and have genuine conceptual existence (p. 80). Just as we can posit the point manifold which we call a plane, and a point outside of it which we connect by lines with every point of the plane, and so generate a three-dimensional manifold in points, we can also posit a point outside of this manifold and connect it similarly with every point already given, thus obtaining a four-dimensional manifold in points. But, "Is it possible to intuit configurations in a hyperspace of points?" (p. 81). While admitting inability to answer with absolute confidence, Professor Keyser thinks that with practise and acquired skill "the *parts* of a familiar *fourfold configuration* may be made to pass before the eye of intuition in such *swift* and *effortless* succession that the configuration *seems present as a whole in a single instant.* If the *process* and *result* are not, properly speaking, *fourfold imagination and fourfold image,* it remains for the psychologist to indicate what is lacking" (p. 82).

A more satisfactory treatment of this problem could have been derived from the study of Poincaré,[3] or even from taking Russell's[4] account of geometry to heart. The geometry with which Professor Keyser deals is pure geometry not yet applied in our world of experience. In pure geometry, the problem of intuiting a space is the problem of holding a complex of logical relations before the mind, and it is certain we can not do this for complex configurations of three- or even two-dimensional point manifolds. In applied geometry, on the other hand, to intuit space as four dimensional would mean to have our experience different from what it is; thus, if the feelings of convergence and accommodation of the eyes, as factors in our perception of depth, varied independently, visual space would be a four-dimensional point manifold; yet while we can state the condition, we can have no idea what the new experience would be like, and so there is no possibility of intuiting our space as four-dimensional in this sense. The paper closes with the usual vindication of the study of 'hypergeometries' through esthetic joy in reasoning.

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[2] Cf. Poincaré, *op. cit.*, pp. 67, 91.

[3] *Loc. Cit.*

[4] 'Principles of Mathematics,' Ch. LXIV. Cambridge, 1903.

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Rôle des sensations internes dans les émotions et dans la perception de la durée. G. R. D'ALLONES. *Revue Philosophique,* December, 1905. Pp. 592–623.

The case is here reported of a woman, fifty-three years of age, uneducated but intelligent, and without any discoverable hereditary taint, who from being naturally of a highly emotional disposition had come, in consequence of sickness and various depleting conditions, to feel, apparently, no emotions at all. The interesting feature of the case is that at the very moment when she declares that she does not feel a certain emotion, she nevertheless shows all the signs of it in their normal intensity. The suspicion, however, that we are dealing here with a 'psychasthenic,' or with the victim of a fixed idea, is not well grounded; there is good reason to believe that her statements about her feelings are true. The author has examined the patient with reference to her sensibility and finds that, while there are no defects such as to cause an appreciable modification of external perception and little perturbation of the motor functions, visceral sensibility is practically abolished and organic sensibility generally profoundly affected. Thus, while tactile sensibility is only lowered, there is complete anesthesia to heat and pain over almost the entire surface of the body. The gustatory sensations are defective; the patient never feels hunger or satiety, thirst rarely, fatigue hardly at all and never the benefit of repose; a sensation serves as a signal when the bladder or rectum is full, but without distress, and the discharge of the function is never attended with the feeling of relief; purgatives cause no colic and no increased sense of need, etc. Castor oil produces nausea, but no feeling of disgust. On one important point the evidence seems defective, namely, as to the sensations accompanying respiration and circulation; but we are assured by the author (p. 614) that the internal reflexes are totally unconscious.

The main inference drawn from these facts coincides with the result previously reached by Sollier,[1] that the essential thing in emotion is the visceral sensibility, and that sensations from 'movements of relation' are only accessory. The author, however, writes from the point of view of the peripheral theory, which Sollier, with his 'cerebral' interpretation of the facts, discards. Whatever the interpretation, the intimate and essential connection of visceral and emotional susceptibility seems to be one of the most certain results of investigation in this field.

Another inference is that we have to distinguish among organic sensations the affective, *i. e.,* visceral and cutaneous painful and thermal, and the non-affective, *i. e.,* sensorial, tactile and external motor.

A further, and important, inference is that we must distinguish emo-

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[1] 'Mécanisme des Emotions,' pp. 178 ff.